Responding to Injustice
Accounts of global justice ascribe responsibilities to actors to comply with and uphold others' rights. Many, however, fail to comply with those responsibilities. In light of this, we might think (I think we ought to think) that others should take on extra responsibilities to ensure that people receive their just entitlements. But, what about those who are denied their own rights? What may they do? I have explored this question in a series of papers, including the following
[1] ‘The Right to Resist Global Injustice’ in The Oxford Handbook of Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) edited by Thom Brooks, pp.510-535. The world we live in is marked by severe and extensive poverty, inequality, and dangerous climate change. In the light of this, accounts of global justice very often ascribe responsibilities to the rich and powerful. But what about those who have been treated unjustly and who lack what they are just entitled to? What are they entitled to do to realize their own rights and the rights of others? This topic has not, so far, received very much systematic analysis by scholars participating in the recent debates in Anglophone political philosophy about the nature of global justice. It is, though, an important question, and answering it requires addressing several complex normative issues. In this paper, I try to motivate support for what I term the Right of Resistance against Global Injustice where this should be understood as a right to bring about greater global justice. More specifically I defend two conceptions of this core idea. Roughly stated, the first maintains that persons have the right to take direct action that will immediately and directly secure their rights or the rights of others (what I shall refer to as the Right of Resistance against Global Injusticei – hereafter RRGIi). The second holds that persons have the right to engage in action that transforms the underlying social, economic and political structures that perpetuate injustice in order to bring about greater justice in the future (what I shall refer to as the Right of Resistance against Global Injusticeii – hereafter RRGIii). In this paper I aim to do four things. First, I outline the two rights and illustrate what they would mean in practice (Sections II-III). Second, I then set out two lines of argument that might be adduced in defence of rights to resist global injustice (Sections IV-V). The chapter then, third, examines two kinds of limits – some arise from a commitment to justice, and some arise from a commitment to political legitimacy (Section VI-VII). Fourth, and finally, I conclude with reflections on the moral significance of these rights and their limits (Section VIII).
[2] 'Responding to Global Injustice: The Right of Resistance', Social Philosophy and Policy forthcoming vol.32 no.1 (2015), pp.51-73.
This paper defends what I term the 'right of resistance against global injustice'. I define this as a right that agents have to act
[i] in ways that are contrary either to (a) existing domestic law or (b) to international law
[ii] in order in order to attempt to change certain practices, policies, or political systems
[iii] so that the agents in question, or others, are better able to enjoy what they are entitled to as a
matter of global justice.
The paper examines who has this right; when they have it (what rights violations trigger this right); against whom resisters may target their action; how agents may engage in resistance and what means they may employ; and, in what circumstances may people engage in resistance. I also examine whether there is a morally relevant difference between the conditions for justified self-protection (where agent-relative considerations may apply) and cases of other-protection such as humanitarian intervention and assistance.
[3] ‘Onora O’Neill on the Agents of Global Justice’ in Reading O’Neill (London: Routledge, 2013) edited by David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson and Daniel Weinstock, pp.133-156 on pages 143-144.
I argue there that those who are denied their rights are entitled to exercise a "right of self-preservation" and a "right of reform" (which correspond to the two rights defended in [1]).
[4] 'Justice in the Transition to a Better World: on the Relationship between Means and Ends' (unpublished). This examines the question: What means may those confronted by serious injustice use in order to bring about a more just world. I discuss three approaches: (a) one which argues that the end justifies the means, (b) a prefigurative approach which holds that the means employed should be the same as one should employ within the just society. Having criticised both, I then defend a third option.
[1] ‘The Right to Resist Global Injustice’ in The Oxford Handbook of Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) edited by Thom Brooks, pp.510-535. The world we live in is marked by severe and extensive poverty, inequality, and dangerous climate change. In the light of this, accounts of global justice very often ascribe responsibilities to the rich and powerful. But what about those who have been treated unjustly and who lack what they are just entitled to? What are they entitled to do to realize their own rights and the rights of others? This topic has not, so far, received very much systematic analysis by scholars participating in the recent debates in Anglophone political philosophy about the nature of global justice. It is, though, an important question, and answering it requires addressing several complex normative issues. In this paper, I try to motivate support for what I term the Right of Resistance against Global Injustice where this should be understood as a right to bring about greater global justice. More specifically I defend two conceptions of this core idea. Roughly stated, the first maintains that persons have the right to take direct action that will immediately and directly secure their rights or the rights of others (what I shall refer to as the Right of Resistance against Global Injusticei – hereafter RRGIi). The second holds that persons have the right to engage in action that transforms the underlying social, economic and political structures that perpetuate injustice in order to bring about greater justice in the future (what I shall refer to as the Right of Resistance against Global Injusticeii – hereafter RRGIii). In this paper I aim to do four things. First, I outline the two rights and illustrate what they would mean in practice (Sections II-III). Second, I then set out two lines of argument that might be adduced in defence of rights to resist global injustice (Sections IV-V). The chapter then, third, examines two kinds of limits – some arise from a commitment to justice, and some arise from a commitment to political legitimacy (Section VI-VII). Fourth, and finally, I conclude with reflections on the moral significance of these rights and their limits (Section VIII).
[2] 'Responding to Global Injustice: The Right of Resistance', Social Philosophy and Policy forthcoming vol.32 no.1 (2015), pp.51-73.
This paper defends what I term the 'right of resistance against global injustice'. I define this as a right that agents have to act
[i] in ways that are contrary either to (a) existing domestic law or (b) to international law
[ii] in order in order to attempt to change certain practices, policies, or political systems
[iii] so that the agents in question, or others, are better able to enjoy what they are entitled to as a
matter of global justice.
The paper examines who has this right; when they have it (what rights violations trigger this right); against whom resisters may target their action; how agents may engage in resistance and what means they may employ; and, in what circumstances may people engage in resistance. I also examine whether there is a morally relevant difference between the conditions for justified self-protection (where agent-relative considerations may apply) and cases of other-protection such as humanitarian intervention and assistance.
[3] ‘Onora O’Neill on the Agents of Global Justice’ in Reading O’Neill (London: Routledge, 2013) edited by David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson and Daniel Weinstock, pp.133-156 on pages 143-144.
I argue there that those who are denied their rights are entitled to exercise a "right of self-preservation" and a "right of reform" (which correspond to the two rights defended in [1]).
[4] 'Justice in the Transition to a Better World: on the Relationship between Means and Ends' (unpublished). This examines the question: What means may those confronted by serious injustice use in order to bring about a more just world. I discuss three approaches: (a) one which argues that the end justifies the means, (b) a prefigurative approach which holds that the means employed should be the same as one should employ within the just society. Having criticised both, I then defend a third option.