One important issue when considering the normative issues raised by climate change is whether it is best to treat these issues in "isolation" from other normative issues (and thus to construct an account of climate justice that brackets out other issues such as poverty, development, trade, migration and so on ("isolationism"); or whether it is best to treat the ethical issues raised by climate change in conjunction with a more general account of justice ("integrationism"). In my research I have defended what I term an "integrationist" approach in a number of places. Different reasons have been given for "isolationism": some defend it on purely principled grounds. Others defend it on more pragmatic grounds. I have argued that neither kind of argument is persuasive. For an extended discussion see my
 ‘Just Emissions’, Philosophy & Public Affairs vol.40 no.4 (2012), pp.255-300.
For earlier discussions of these issues, and defences of, an integrationist approach see:
 ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, Leiden Journal of International Law vol.18 no.4 (2005), pp.747-775. [This argues that "the ‘polluter pays’ principle must be located within the context of a general theory of justice and, on its own, it is incomplete", p.765: see pp.747 &765-766.]
 ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Climate Change’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence vol.XIX no.2 (2006), pp.255-278.
 'Justice and the Distribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions', Journal of Global Ethics vol.5 no.2 (2009), pp.125-146.
 ‘Justice and the Duties of the Advantaged: A Defence’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy vol.14 no.4 (2011), pp.439-448.
 ‘Global Justice, Climate Change, and Human Rights’ in Leadership and Global Justice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) edited by Douglas A. Hicks and Thad Williamson, pp.91-112. [This essay notes that the distinction between "isolationism" and "integrationism" can be applied to at least four other separate questions, namely (i) the allocation of responsibilities, (ii) the distribution of permits to emit greenhouse gases, (iii) the evaluation of climatic impacts, and (iv) the mitigation and adaptation policies adopted. I argue in each case for an integrationist position. I do not claim that this list is exhaustive: one can, for example, also apply it to institutional design. An isolationist would propose institutions designed solely to implement principles of climate justice, whereas an integrationist would propose designing institutions in the light of climate and other principles of justice.]
 'Distributive Justice and Climate Change' in The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press), edited by Serena Olsaretti. [This chapter considers two questions of distributive justice that arise when we face dangerous climate change. The first (the Just Target Question) concerns what balance to strike between ensuring that moral subjects are not harmed by climatic changes and ensuring that the policies required to prevent harmful climatic changes are not unduly onerous. The second (the Just Burden Question) concerns how the costs involved in combating dangerous climate change should be distributed among duty-bearers. The chapter identifies several methodological issues we need to confront to address these questions. In addition to this, it outlines how one might answer the Just Target Question, and evaluates several leading accounts of how to answer the Just Burden Question. One central finding is that the issues of justice raised by climate change cannot be treated in isolation but must be analysed as part of a more general global and intergenerational account of justice.]