Just Distribution of Emissions
There is a limit on the amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted if we are to have a reasonable probability of not causing dangerous climate change. How should this 'budget' of permissible greenhouse gas emissions be distributed? [Of course, specifying what constitutes a 'reasonable' probability and what counts as 'dangerous climate change' raise further normative questions, addressed elsewhere in my research.]
[1] ‘Just Emissions’, Philosophy & Public Affairs vol.40 no.4 (2012), pp.255-300.
Many argue that that the right to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed equally. In this paper, I criticise this view. I consider four different arguments for the equal per capita view but find each unpersuasive. I then argue that the equal per capita view is vulnerable to two general challenges . First, it wrongly treats one good (to emit greenhouse gases) in isolation from all other goods. Second, it overlooks the fact that emissions are substitutable: that is, that many of the specific goods associated with the activities that involve emissions can be provided in other ways: thus, it is wrongheaded to focus on emissions, rather than the goods. The paper concludes by setting out a five step procedure for determining how emissions should be distributed.
For other earlier discussions of how rights to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed, see
[2] 'Climate Change, Energy Rights, and Equality' in The Ethics of Global Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) edited by Denis Arnold, pp.77-103.
[3] 'Justice and the Distribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions', Journal of Global Ethics vol.5 no.2 (2009), pp.125-146. This is reprinted in
· Global Social Justice (London: Routledge, 2011) edited by Heather Widdows and Nicola J. Smith, pp.58-81.
· Globalization and Common Responsibilities of States (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) edited by Koen De Feyter.
[1] ‘Just Emissions’, Philosophy & Public Affairs vol.40 no.4 (2012), pp.255-300.
Many argue that that the right to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed equally. In this paper, I criticise this view. I consider four different arguments for the equal per capita view but find each unpersuasive. I then argue that the equal per capita view is vulnerable to two general challenges . First, it wrongly treats one good (to emit greenhouse gases) in isolation from all other goods. Second, it overlooks the fact that emissions are substitutable: that is, that many of the specific goods associated with the activities that involve emissions can be provided in other ways: thus, it is wrongheaded to focus on emissions, rather than the goods. The paper concludes by setting out a five step procedure for determining how emissions should be distributed.
For other earlier discussions of how rights to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed, see
[2] 'Climate Change, Energy Rights, and Equality' in The Ethics of Global Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) edited by Denis Arnold, pp.77-103.
[3] 'Justice and the Distribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions', Journal of Global Ethics vol.5 no.2 (2009), pp.125-146. This is reprinted in
· Global Social Justice (London: Routledge, 2011) edited by Heather Widdows and Nicola J. Smith, pp.58-81.
· Globalization and Common Responsibilities of States (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) edited by Koen De Feyter.