A: Responsibilities to Mitigate and Enable Adaptation
For an early statement of my view on who should bear the burden of combating climate change, see my
 ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, Leiden Journal of International Law vol.18 no.4 (2005), pp.747-775. This paper proposes a 'hybrid model', according to which climatic responsibilities should be distributed in light of two principles - the Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle. (The paper also discusses a third principle - the Beneficiary Pays Principle.) This has been reprinted in:
· The Global Justice Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009) edited by Thom Brooks.
· Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) edited by Stephen Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson and Henry Shue.
. Environmental Justice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015) edited by Steve Vanderheiden.
· An excerpt is reprinted in La Pensée Écologique. Une Anthologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013) edited by D. Bourg and A. Fragnière.
For a more recent statement, see.
 'Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy vol.13 no.1 (2010), pp.203-228. This is reprinted in
· Democracy, Equality, and Justice (London: Routledge, 2010) edited by Matt Matravers and Lukas Meyer, and in
· Intergenerational Justice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) edited by Lukas Meyer.
For further analyses of particular aspects see.
 ‘Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History’, Journal of Social Philosophy, vol.37 no.3 (2006), pp.464-482. [This examines the moral significance of historic emissions.]
 'Justice and the Duties of the Advantaged: A Defence’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy vol.14 no.4 (2011), pp.439-448. [This defends  above from criticisms levelled by Carl Knight.]
 'Human Rights, Responsibilities, and Climate Change' in Global Basic Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) edited by Charles Beitz and Robert Goodin, pp.227-247. This has been reprinted in: Environmental Rights (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) edited by Steve Vanderheiden. [This analyses Henry Shue's treatment of climate responsibilities].
B: First-Order and Second-Order Responsibilities
The papers listed above examine who should pay for the costs involved in climate mitigation, adaptation and compensation. A further question is who is responsible for inducing others to comply with those obligations. I take up that issue in this paper. It distinguishes between first-order duties (in this case, duties to mitigate and enable adaptation and compensation) and second-order duties (duties to induce agents to comply with their first order duties.) So whereas papers - are largely focused on first-order responsibilities, paper  is on second-order responsibilities.
 ‘ ‘Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens’, Journal of Political Philosophy vol.22 no.2 (2014), pp.125-149 (Special Issue: Philosophy, Politics & Society).
There is also a discussion of the duty to promote institutions in ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, p.769 (see Principle (D4) which affirms a "duty to construct institutions that discourage future non-compliance").