Climatic Responsibilities
A: Responsibilities to Mitigate and Enable Adaptation
For an early statement of my view on who should bear the burden of combating climate change, see my
[1] ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, Leiden Journal of International Law vol.18 no.4 (2005), pp.747-775. This paper proposes a 'hybrid model', according to which climatic responsibilities should be distributed in light of two principles - the Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle. (The paper also discusses a third principle - the Beneficiary Pays Principle.) This has been reprinted in:
· The Global Justice Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009) edited by Thom Brooks.
· Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) edited by Stephen Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson and Henry Shue.
. Environmental Justice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015) edited by Steve Vanderheiden.
· An excerpt is reprinted in La Pensée Écologique. Une Anthologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013) edited by D. Bourg and A. Fragnière.
For a more recent statement, see.
[2] 'Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy vol.13 no.1 (2010), pp.203-228. This is reprinted in
· Democracy, Equality, and Justice (London: Routledge, 2010) edited by Matt Matravers and Lukas Meyer, and in
· Intergenerational Justice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) edited by Lukas Meyer.
For further analyses of particular aspects see.
[3] ‘Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History’, Journal of Social Philosophy, vol.37 no.3 (2006), pp.464-482. [This examines the moral significance of historic emissions.]
[4] 'Justice and the Duties of the Advantaged: A Defence’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy vol.14 no.4 (2011), pp.439-448. [This defends [2] above from criticisms levelled by Carl Knight.]
[5] 'Human Rights, Responsibilities, and Climate Change' in Global Basic Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) edited by Charles Beitz and Robert Goodin, pp.227-247. This has been reprinted in: Environmental Rights (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) edited by Steve Vanderheiden. [This analyses Henry Shue's treatment of climate responsibilities].
B: First-Order and Second-Order Responsibilities
The papers listed above examine who should pay for the costs involved in climate mitigation, adaptation and compensation. A further question is who is responsible for inducing others to comply with those obligations. I take up that issue in this paper. It distinguishes between first-order duties (in this case, duties to mitigate and enable adaptation and compensation) and second-order duties (duties to induce agents to comply with their first order duties.) So whereas papers [1]-[5] are largely focused on first-order responsibilities, paper [6] is on second-order responsibilities.
[6] ‘ ‘Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens’, Journal of Political Philosophy vol.22 no.2 (2014), pp.125-149 (Special Issue: Philosophy, Politics & Society).
There is also a discussion of the duty to promote institutions in ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, p.769 (see Principle (D4) which affirms a "duty to construct institutions that discourage future non-compliance").